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Production in an economy is a set of firms’ activities as suppliers and customers; a firm buys goods
from other firms, puts value added and sells products to others in a giant network of production.
Empirical study is lacking despite the fact that the structure of the production network is important
to understand and make models for many aspects of dynamics in economy. We study a nation-wide
production network comprising a million firms and millions of supplier-customer links by using
recent statistical methods developed in physics. We show in the empirical analysis scale-free degree
distribution, disassortativity, correlation of degree to firm-size, and community structure having
sectoral and regional modules. Since suppliers usually provide credit to their customers, who supply
it to theirs in turn, each link is actually a creditor-debtor relationship. We also study chains
of failures or bankruptcies that take place along those links in the network, and corresponding
avalanche-size distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
The physics community has recently witnessed consid-
erable development of statistical methods for quantify-
ing large networks, including biology, information, tech-
nology, economics and society [1–3]. The development
enables one to quantify statistical features, modular and
heterogeneous structures of large networks that are not
amenable even to visualization.
Production network in economics refers to a line of eco-
nomic activities in which firms buy intermediate goods
from “upstream” firms, put value added on them, and
sell the goods to “downstream” firms. Net sum of value
added in the whole network is basically the net total
production in a nation, that is, gross domestic product
(GDP).
Consider a ship manufacturer, for example. The man-
ufacturer buys a number of intermediate goods includ-
ing steel materials, mechanical and electronic devices,
etc. and produces ships. The firm puts value added on
the products in each process of production. In the up-
stream side of the ship manufacturer, a processed steel
manufacturer could be present, which in turn buys in-
termediate goods such as raw steel and fabricating ma-
chines. The steel manufacturer may supply its products
to car manufactures as well. Similarly in the downstream
side, including retail and wholesale firms.
The entire line of these processes of putting value
added in turn, therefore, forms a giant web of produc-
tion ranging from upstream to downstream, ultimately
down to consumers. Each firm needs labor and financ-
ing in addition to intermediate goods, and utilizes these
inputs to produce outputs in anticipation for return of
profits. Thus, a real economy has its driving force in
production, and is fueled by labor and financing.
There are studies based on theoretical models of pro-
duction networks, notably in overlapping communities
between economists and physicists. They include inven-
tory dynamics [4–6] (see also [7]), suppliers/customers
dynamics [8], and credit-chain model [9–11]. These
promising works are, unfortunately, not based on any
empirical study on the structure of production networks.
While economic networks of inter-bank [12–14], banks-
firms [15] financing relations, and inter-firm ownerships
[16, 17] are studied based on recent empirical data (see
[18] and references therein), there exists a gap to be filled
in the study of inter-firm credit and supplier-customer re-
lations. So it is highly desirable to investigate the struc-
ture of production network on a nation-wide scale to de-
velop insightful models, but such a study has been con-
sidered a formidable task so far.
The present paper precisely performs such an empir-
ical study of the large-scale structure of a production
network that comprises most firms in a nation as nodes,
and supplier-customer relations as links. We will find
that the network is not regular nor random, but pos-
sesses scale-free degree distribution, disassortativity, as
well as other statistical properties, and structural mod-
ules that depend on industrial sectors and geographical
regions with highly varying modular sizes.
The structural heterogeneity would have many impor-
tant consequences in dynamics on a production network.
For example, demand by firms and consumers down-
stream will propagate upstream; when foreign countries
increase demand for ships, it will result in a growing out-
put of ship manufacturers, which possibly stimulate pro-
duction of processed steel, raw metals, related machines
etc. in upstream firms. This propagation will not take
place homogeneously but heterogeneously.
Conversely, decreasing demand also causes a chain re-
action. An individual firm’s profit is equal to sales minus
costs. It may use factors of production in anticipation of
profit, but always faces uncertainty in ex-post demand,
labor and financial costs, price change of intermediate
goods, and so forth. Only a posteriori , profits are deter-
mined through the interaction of firms in the production
network. Once a firm goes into a state of financial insol-
vency or bankruptcy, its upstream firms have its balance-
sheets deteriorated by losing fractional profits, and may
eventually go into bankruptcy. We will show that such
a chain of failure is by no means negligible, due to the
network structure, and so that this has a considerable
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2effect at macroeconomic activity.
In Section II, we describe how nodes and links are sur-
veyed and recorded in our dataset of a production net-
work, in addition to another dataset of an exhaustive list
of bankruptcies occurred in the network over a certain
period of time. In Section III, we study the structure of
the production network by employing statistical methods
in [1–3]. In Section IV, we extract community structure
in the network. In Section V, we examine the chains of
bankruptcies with a focus on avalanche-size distribution.
After a brief discussion in Section VI, we conclude in
Section VII.
II. SUPPLIER-CUSTOMER LINKS AND
BANKRUPTCY DATA
Let us say that a directional link is present as A→ B
in a production network, where firm A is a supplier to
another firm B, or equivalently, B is a customer of A.
While it is difficult to record every transaction of supply
and purchase among firms, it is also pointless to have a
record that a firm buys a pencil from another. Necessary
for our study are data of links such that the relation
A → B is crucial for the activity of one or both A and
B. If at least one of the firms at either end of a link
nominates the other firm as most important suppliers or
customers, then the link should be listed.
Our dataset for supplier-customer links is based on this
idea. Tokyo Shoko Research, Inc., one of the leading
credit research agencies in Japan, regularly gathers credit
information on most of active firms through investigation
of financial statements and corporate documents, and by
hearing-based survey at branch offices located across the
nation. Financial and credit information of individual
firms are compiled in commercially available databases.
The credit information of individual firm includes its sup-
pliers and customers, up to 24 companies for each, that
are considered to be most crucial for its business activ-
ities. We assume that the links playing important roles
in the production network are recorded at either end of
each link as we describe above, while we should under-
stand that it is possible to drop relatively unimportant
links from the data. Although amounts of transactions
provide information of weights on links, that is of relative
importance regarding suppliers and customers, such data
are only partially available at the moment. We simply
ignore the weights in this paper. It is also remarked that
the financial sector is under-represented in the database
as those financial companies’ links are not included.
We have a snapshot of production networks compiled
in September 2006. In the data, the number of firms is
roughly a million, and the number of directional links is
more than four million (see Section III). The set of nodes
in the network covers essentially most of the domestic
firms that are active in the sense that their credit infor-
mation is required. Attached to each firm is financial in-
formation of firm-size, which is measured as sales, profit,
TABLE I: Classification of industrial sectors. Third column
shows numbers of major-groups/groups/industries classified
in each division. Fourth column are fractional numbers of
firms in the divisions according to primary industry of each
firm in the dataset of September 2006.
divisionsa #class.a #firms(%)
A agriculture 1/4/20 0.53
B forestry 1/5/9 0.05
C fisheries 2/4/17 0.11
D mining 1/6/30 0.18
E construction 3/20/49 29.92
F manufacturing 24/150/563 17.69
G electricity/gas/heat/water 4/6/12 0.06
H information/communications 5/15/29 2.42
I transport 7/24/46 3.54
J wholesale/retail trade 12/44/150 29.07
K finance/insurance 7/19/68 0.65
L real estate 2/6/10 2.61
M food establishments 3/12/18 1.46
N medical/health care/welfare 3/15/37 1.03
O education/learning support 2/12/33 0.36
P compound servicesb 2/4/8 0.64
Q servicesc 15/68/164 9.45
R governmentc 2/5/5 0.18
S unable to classify 1/1/1 0.03
Total 97/420/1,269 99.98
aJapan Standard Industrial Classification, Rev. 11, March 2002:
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/index/seido/sangyo/index.htm
bGovernment-affiliated postal services, and agriculture, forestry,
fisheries and business cooperative associations.
cNot elsewhere classified.
number of employees and their growth, major and mi-
nor classification into industrial sectors, details of prod-
ucts, the firm’s banks, principal shareholders, and miscel-
laneous information including geographical location. In
particular, the industrial sectors are classified into more
than 1,200 industries and are categorized hierarchically
into 19 divisions, 97 major groups and more than 400 mi-
nor groups (see Table I). For example, the manufacturing
sector (F) is classified into 24 major groups as tabulated
in Table II. Each firm has industry classification accord-
ing to the sector it belongs to as primary (also secondary
and tertiary, if any) industry.
In addition, we use a database that records “dead”
firms, namely business failure or bankruptcy. This
dataset is an exhaustive list of bankrupted firms since Oc-
tober 2006 for one year, corresponding to the snapshot of
the network. The data is exhaustive in the sense that any
bankrupted firm with a total amount of debt exceeding
10 million yen (roughly 70 thousand euro or 100 thousand
US dollar) is listed therein. Each record includes the date
of failure, the total amount of debt when bankrupted and
categorized causes of bankruptcy. The dataset has high
quality and its statistical tabulation is employed by the
Statistics Bureau of government for an official statistics.
In the production network, 0.5% to 1% of nodes exit in a
year due to failure (see Section V). Thus, by combining
3TABLE II: 24 major groups of the manufacturing sector (F).
id major group #firms(%)
09 foods 10.15
10 beverages, tobacco and feed 1.95
11 textile mill products, except apparel/related 3.08
12 apparel and related finished products 5.00
13 lumber and wood products, except furniture 3.57
14 furniture and fixtures 2.44
15 pulp, paper and paper products 2.90
16 printing and allied industries 6.51
17 chemical and allied products 3.28
18 petroleum and coal products 0.29
19 plastic products, except otherwise classified 4.98
20 rubber products 1.10
21 leather tanning, leather/fur products 0.83
22 ceramic, stone and clay products 5.09
23 iron and steel 1.97
24 non-ferrous metals and products 1.35
25 fabricated metal products 12.30
26 general machinery 13.83
27 electrical machinery, equipment and supplies 5.08
28 information and communication electronics 1.33
29 electronic parts and devices 2.57
30 transportation equipment 3.19
31 precision instruments and machinery 2.06
32 miscellaneous manufacturing industries 5.14
the two datasets of supplier-customer links and actual
failures, one has an opportunity to do an empirical study
of the dynamics of failure on the production network.
And this point differs from the previous studies on the
Japanese production network including [19, 20].
III. STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION
NETWORK
A. Global connectivity
The production network as a directed graph is not uni-
directional from upstream to downstream, but is highly
entangled depending on the products and services that
each firm produces. Let us first examine the global con-
nectivity by using a similar graph-theoretical method
as was performed in the study of the hyperlink struc-
ture of the world-wide web [21]. The following numbers
are for the dataset of September 2006, which contains
1,019,854 firms as nodes of the network excluding all the
bankrupted firms before the month.
From a directed graph, one can obtain an undirected
graph by simply ignoring the direction of links. A weakly
connected component of the directed graph refers to a
connected component in the undirected counterpart. The
production network has a giant weakly connected com-
ponent (GWCC) comprised of 99.0% (1,009,597 nodes)
of the whole. The rest are disconnected components, all
of which are smaller than 12 in size.
A strongly connected component (SCC) in a directed
graph is a set of nodes such that for any pair of nodes
u and v in the set there is a directed path from u to
v. There exists a giant SCC having the size of 45.8%
of the GWCC (462,563 nodes). Calling it GSCC, the
GWCC turns out to be decomposed into mutually dis-
joint parts as GWCC = GSCC + IN + OUT + TE, where
IN is the set of non-GSCC nodes, from which one can
reach a node (so all the nodes) in the GSCC. Symmetri-
cally, OUT is the set of non-GSCC nodes, to which one
can go from any node in the SCC. And TE is the rest
of the GWCC, called tendrils, which consists of nodes
that have no access to the GSCC and are not reachable
from it. Hanging off IN and OUT are tendrils contain-
ing nodes that are reachable from portions of IN, or that
can reach to portions of OUT, without passing through
the SCC. See Figure 6 in [2] understanding their defini-
tions for giant GIN and GOUT as GIN = IN + GSCC
and GOUT = OUT + GSCC. The IN, OUT and TE are
composed of 18.0% (182,018), 32.1% (324,569) and 4.0%
(40,447) nodes, respectively, in the GWCC.
By comparing the abundance of industrial divisions
in each of these giant components, we observe that in
the portion of IN the numbers of firms in the sectors
of real estate (L), forestry (B), information and commu-
nications (H) are larger when compared with the corre-
sponding sectors in the SCC. In the portion of OUT more
abundant are medical, health care and welfare (N), food
establishments (M), education (O). This fact is reason-
able, because these industries are located either in the up-
stream or in the downstream. Nevertheless, all industries
are basically embedded in the SCC with entanglement.
We shall study community structure in Section IV.
The diameter of a graph is the maximum length for all
ordered pairs (u, v) of the shortest path from u to v. The
average distance is the average length for all those pairs
(u, v). We found that the average distance is 4.59 while
the diameter is 22.
B. Degree distribution
In the rest of this paper, we focus on the GWCC ignor-
ing small disconnected components. Denoting the num-
bers of nodes and links by N and M respectively, they
are for the GWCC
N = 1, 009, 597 , (1)
M = 4, 041, 442 . (2)
A firm has suppliers for and customers of it, whose
numbers are in-degree and out-degree, respectively, ac-
cording to our definition of link direction. We show that
both have a long-tail distribution. Denoting the degree
distribution by P (k), cumulative distribution is written
as P>(k) =
∑∞
k′=k P (k
′). We plot the cumulative distri-
butions for in and out-degrees in Fig. 1.
Both for in-degree and out-degrees of a firm, the dis-
tribution has a heavy tail that can be characterized by a
4FIG. 1: (a) Cumulative distribution for in-degree (number of
suppliers). A power-law distribution P>(k) ∝ k−µ is fitted by
MLE with µ = 1.35 ± 0.02 (a solid line). (b) Same for out-
degree (number of customers). The line is for µ = 1.26±0.02.
power-law P>(k) ∝ k−µ. We estimated the exponent µ
by maximum likelihood (MLE), i.e. the Hill’s estimate
[22], in a tail-region k > k∗. In Fig. 1, the estimates are
shown for k∗ = 40, namely µ = 1.35± 0.02 for in-degree
and µ = 1.26 ± 0.02 for out-degree, by solid lines. Here
the errors correspond to 1.96σ (99% significance level) of
the estimated standard errors σ.
The first two moments of in/out-degree are
〈kin〉 ≡ 〈kout〉 = 4.003 , (3)〈
k2in
〉
= 1.041× 103 , 〈k2out〉 = 1.036× 103 . (4)
For the undirected graph, we have
〈k〉 = 2M/N = 8.006 , (5)〈
k2
〉
= 3.070× 103 . (6)
Firms with largest in-degrees belong to the sectors of
manufacturing and construction among others, including
heavy industry, electrical machinery (e.g. Hitachi, Mit-
subishi, Panasonic, Toshiba), automobiles (Toyota, Nis-
san, Honda), metal production, and so on. Large con-
struction companies are also included. Firms with the
largest out-degrees are worldwide traders, distributors of
construction-related materials, metals, petroleum, me-
chanical and electrical instruments, and general whole-
sale companies, as well as the manufacturing firms men-
tioned for in-degrees.
C. Correlation to firm-size
The number of suppliers/customers of a firm depends
obviously on firm-size, an important attribute. A large
firm likely possesses numerous suppliers to buy various
intermediate goods; similarly it has a number of cus-
tomers to sell its products to so that it has the large size.
Firm-size can be measured in different ways, basically by
stock variables (total-asset, number of employees, etc.)
or flow variables (sales, profits, etc.).
The firm-size, however measured, obeys a power-law,
being well known as a Zipf’s law. For the nodes in the
network, we examined financial data (availability exceeds
70% presumably missing only extremely small firms).
The cumulative distribution for the sales of those nodes
(0.73 million) is shown in Fig. 2 (a). The Zipf’s law,
P>(x) ∝ x−α, is obvious for sales x. The exponent is
close to unity, α = 0.96 ± 0.02 by MLE estimated for
x > 104 million yen.
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FIG. 2: (a) Cumulative distribution for firm-size measured
by sales. A power-law distribution P>(x) ∝ x−α is fitted by
MLE with α = 0.96± 0.02 (a solid line). (b) Scatter-plot for
degree (total) and sales.
Fig. 2 (b) depicts a scatter-plot for total degree and
sales. Correlation between the firm’s degree and size
5is positive. The statistical significance can be quanti-
fied by non-parametric statistics, such as Kendall’s rank
correlation, τ (see [23]). For the data, τ = 0.391 (p-
value < 10−7), which shows a significant positive correla-
tion between the degree and firm-size. We used different
quantities for firm-size, such as profits and the number
of employees, and obtained very similar results. In addi-
tion, when considering either of in- or out-degree, we can
observe that each has a positive correlation with firm-
size.
D. Transitivity
Unlike many social networks, the supplier of a firm’s
supplier is not likely also to be the firm’s supplier, and
similarly for customer, because such a process of pro-
duction is redundant for most cases. Transitivity means
how high the number of triangles is present in the net-
work (see the review [3]). Here we regard the network as
an undirected graph.
Global clustering coefficient is defined by Cg =
(3×number of triangles)/(number of connected triples),
where a connected triple means a pair of nodes that are
connected to another node. Cg is the mean probability
that two firms who have a common supplier/customer are
also suppliers/customers of each other. The undirected
graph of our dataset yields
Cg = 1.87× 10−3 = 0.187% . (7)
To compare this value with that for a class of ran-
dom graphs having a same degree sequence but randomly
rewired links, we use the expected value of global clus-
tering coefficient given by [24]
Cg =
〈k〉
N
[〈
k2
〉− 〈k〉
〈k〉2
]2
. (8)
Putting the values (5), (6) and (1) into (8), we have
Cg = 1.81 × 10−2. The observed value (7) is, therefore,
merely 10% of (8), and shows weaker transitivity than
what is expected by chance. This is reasonable because
triangular relations, during the selection of suppliers and
customers, are suppressed in the formation of them.
The average of local clustering coefficient is, on the
other hand, equal to 4.58% for the same dataset.
E. Degree correlation
For each node, the in-degree and out-degree are highly
correlated. This is consistent with what we saw in Sec-
tion III C that each quantity has positive correlation with
firm-size.
For each link, to see the assortative mixing with respect
to degrees (k1, k2) at both end of each link [25], or de-
gree correlation, let us examine the joint distribution for
(k1, k2). Here we ignore the direction of links, but even
when taking the possible four combinations of in/out at
a directed link, we obtain similar results. To test for the
assortativity, we calculate the frequency F (k1, k2) that
the pair of k1 and k2 appears at either end of a link
in the network. Then compare it with a same quantity
Fr(k1, k2) that is obtained in a randomized network with
the same degree sequence. We generated 1,000 random-
ized networks, and quantify as the ratio F/Fr where Fr
is the average for the randomizations.
FIG. 3: Joint distribution for degrees (total) at end of each
link. The value is the ratio of the actual frequency divided
by what is expected by chance in random networks with the
same degree sequence as the actual one.
The result is shown in Fig. 3. One can observe that
large-degree nodes, large firms, are connected with small-
degree nodes, small firms. For the hubs referred to in the
end of Section III B, they have a large number of suppliers
and customers, but similarly for firms with intermediate-
size, displaying disassortativity [25]. This can be quanti-
fied by the Pearson correlation coefficient r for (k1, k2).
For the data, we have
r = −0.0747± 0.0002 , (9)
where the error calculated by the method given in [25].
This claims that r is negative with a statistical signifi-
cance.
IV. COMMUNITY STRUCTURE
The global connectivity examined in Section III A
shows that basically all industries are highly entangled
with each other within the weakly or strongly connected
component. Yet the connectivity alone does not tell how
dense or sparse the stream of production is distributed
depending on industrial or geographical groups. Detec-
tion of community structure is to find how nodes cluster
into tightly-knit groups with high density in intra-groups
and with lower connectivity in inter-groups.
We focus, in this section, on the manufacturing sec-
tor with 0.12 million firms, in order to understand the
sector’s modular structure by excluding other dominant
6TABLE III: Communities extracted for the subgraph composed of manufacturing firms as nodes (about 0.12 million). Modu-
larity optimization was recursively done for largest communities to obtain the sub-communities, ten of which are shown here.
In each of them are shown ten firms with largest degrees are listed with names, major groups (primary/secondary/tertiary, if
any in this order) of industrial sectors (see Table II), and sub-community sizes.
no. annotation firms (major groups; primary/secondary/tertiary), . . . [community-size]
01 heavy
industry
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (30/26), Kawasaki Heavy Industries (26/30), Kobe Steel (23/25),
Ishikawajima-harima Heavy Industries (30/26), Sumitomo Heavy Industries (26), Nippon Steel (23), Kub-
ota Industries (30/27/23), Mitsui Engineering and Shipbuilding (30), Hitachi Zosen Shipbuilding (26),
Sumitomo Metal Industries (23), . . . [7,447]
02 foods Itoham Foods (09), Prima Meat Packers (09), Yamazaki Baking (09), Nisshin Seifun Flour (09), Maruha
Nichiro Foods (09), Nippon Flour Mills (09), Q.P. Foods (09), Nihon Shokken Foods (09), Toyo Suisan
Foods (09), Ichiban-foods (09), . . . [7,115]
03 transportation
equipment
Honda (30/27), Nissan (30), Toyota Motor (30), Aisin (25/30/27), Mitsubishi Motors (30), Denso (30/27),
Fuji Heavy Industries (30), Toyota Industries (30/26), Suzuki Motor (30), Isuzu Motors (30), . . . [5,769]
04 construction
material
Sumitomo Osaka Cement (22), Air-Water Industrial Gas (17/18), Kyowa Concrete (22), Hokukon Concrete
(22), Marukin Steel Materials (23), Mitsubishi Construction Materials (25/22), Hinode Steel/Manhole
(23/22), Nihon Kogyo Industrial (22/13), Lafarge Aso Cement (22), Maeta Concrete (22), . . . [2,644]
05 pulp/paper Oji Paper (15), Rengo Paper (15), Nippon Paper (15), Oji Chiyoda Container (15), Tomoku Container (15),
Morishigyo Paper (15), Settsu Carton (15), Morishigyo Paper Sales (15), Crown Package (15), Yamato-
shiki Paper (15/19), . . . [3,697]
06 electronics(a) Hitachi (28/29/27), Fujitsu (32/28), NEC (28/29), TDK (27/29), Oki Electric (28/29), Hitachi High-
Technologies (31/26), Rohm Semi-conductors (29), Murata Electronics (27), IBM Japan (28), Japan Radio
Communication Equipment (28/27), . . . [3,082]
07 electronics(b) Matsushita (Panasonic) (27/31), Sharp (29/27/28), Sanyo (27/25), Panasonic Shikoku Electronics
(29/27/28), Pioneer (27/28), Matsushita Battery (27), Sanyo Tottori (28), Matsushita Refrigeration
(27/26), Kenwood (28), CMK Electronic Devices (29), . . . [2,921]
08 electronics(c) Canon (28/26/31), Seiko Epson (28/29), Omron (27), Nikon (31/26), Ricoh (26/28), Fujinon Optics (31),
Hoya Optics (31), Casio (26/31/28), Pentax Optics (31/28), Sony EMCS Electronic (27/28), . . . [2,692]
09 electronics(d) Toshiba (27/28/29), Stanley Electric (27/26), Toshiba Lighting and Technology (27/26/29), Ushio Electric
(25/27/26), Hamamatsu Photonics (29/27), Nippon Electric Glass (22), Toshiba Tec (26/27), GS Yuasa
Industry (27/29), Iwasaki Electric (27), Topcon Electric (31), . . . [2,320]
10 apparel Renoun Apparel (12), Onward Kashiyama Apparel (12), MC Knit Apparel (12), World Apparel (12),
Sanyo Shokai Apparel (12), Itokin Apparel (12), Fujii Fabrics (11), Sanei-International Apparel (12), YKK
Fastening and Accesaries (32), World Apparel (12), . . . [1,567]
sectors including wholesale and retail trade, which obvi-
ously have a different role in the stream of production
from the core of manufacturing sector.
We use the method of maximizing modularity, intro-
duced by [26] and implemented for large-scale graphs in
[27] as a greedy optimization. While considerable stud-
ies have been conducted to develop various methods for
community extraction, we use the modularity optimiza-
tion for its clear interpretation in terms of statistical
hypothesis (also see [28] for a comparative study). Let
eij be the fraction of edges in the network that connect
nodes in group i to those in group j, and let ai ≡
∑
j eij ,
bj ≡
∑
i eij . Then modularity Q is defined by
Q =
∑
i
(eii − aibi) (10)
which is the fraction of edges that fall within groups, mi-
nus the expected value of the fraction under the hypothe-
sis that edges fall randomly irrespectively of the commu-
nity structure. The method is formulated as an optimiza-
tion problem to find a partition of nodes into mutually
disjoint groups such that the corresponding value of Q is
maximum.
As shown in [29, 30], however, the method can give
undesired grouping, depending on the density of connec-
tions and the network size. Especially, large communi-
ties can potentially contain sub-communities. Currently,
without an established method to avoid this problem of
resolution limit (see [31], for example, and also [32]), we
shall check the structure of detected communities by con-
straining modularity optimization on each single commu-
nity, especially for those with relatively large community-
size.
We apply the method of community extraction to the
undirected subgraph whose nodes consist of only firms
in the manufacturing sector (division F in Table I). The
resulting modularity (10) is Q = 0.566± 0.001, which in-
dicates strong community structure (the error calculated
by the method given in [25]). The number of extracted
communities exceeds a thousand, whose sizes range from
a few to more than 10,000. From the database of the
information on the firms, we found that many of those
small communities are each located in same geographical
areas forming specialized production flows. An example
is a small group of flour-maker, noodle-foods producers,
bakeries, and packing/labeling companies in a rural area.
7FIG. 4: (Color online) Layout of nodes for firms in the manufacturing sector (F) by a force-directed method. The links are
omitted, and different colors are put on the nodes belonging to four largest communities. The community of color red (middle
bottom and encircled by a dotted line) is divided into three sub-communities of electronics (a), (b) and (c) given in Table III
(enlarged in the right column).
On the other hand, five large communities exceed
10,000 each in size, being possibly subject to the
above problem of resolution. After checking the sub-
communities in the above mentioned fashion, we obtained
the communities as tabulated in Table III. The necessity
of this procedure can be clearly seen for the communities
of so-annotated “electronics” (a)–(d), which constitute a
single community in the first stage of optimization. Each
firm is classified into one or more industrial sectors, and
the major-group classifications (2 digits; see Table II).
Obviously a community contains those firms in closely
related industrial sectors. The annotations — heavy in-
dustries, foods, transportation equipment, etc. — are
made by such observations.
Let us closely examine the modular structure of those
large communities. Note that ten firms with the largest
degrees (typically largest firm-sizes) are listed in each
community. We note that these large firms in a same
community do not form a set of nodes that are mutu-
ally linked in nearly all possible ways, or a quasi-clique.
Rather, with their suppliers and customers, they form
a quasi-clique in a corresponding bipartite graph as fol-
lows. A supplier-customer link u → v for a set of nodes
V (u, v ∈ V ) can be considered as an edge in a bipar-
tite graph that has exactly two copies of V as V1 and V2
(u ∈ V1 and v ∈ V2). Those large and competing firms
quite often share a set of suppliers to some extent, de-
pending on the industrial sectors, geographical locations
and so on.
For example, Honda (v1), Nissan (v2) and Toyota (v3)
possibly have a number of suppliers ui of mechanical
parts, electronic devices, chassis and assembling ma-
chines, etc., in common. Then the links form a clique
or a quasi-clique in the bipartite graph, where most pos-
sible links from ui to v1, v2, v3, . . . are present. This
forms a portion in the original graph with a higher den-
sity than other portions. By enumerating cliques in the
bipartite graph and examining them, we found that this
is actually the case for the community (03) in Table III,
and similarly for all the other communities therein.
For the case of electronics (a)–(d), those quasi-cliques
are further separated into groups. Namely, the suppli-
ers belong to different groups of industrial organization
for historical reasons and the so-called keiretsu, and/or
are located in divided geographical sectors. The sub-
communities (a)–(d) can be considered as such separate
groups with mutually sparse links. The electronics (b),
for instance, are originated and developed in an urban
area in western Japan, not in eastern urban area of the
Tokyo, being different from group (a).
These interpretations of modular structure should be
strengthened by more detailed analysis, especially with
a new technique for extraction of communities that are
present in multi-scale levels in the hierarchical organiza-
8tion of the production of network (see [33, 34] for exam-
ple), which is to be published elsewhere.
Here, to check the intra-group and inter-group connec-
tivities, we resort to visualization of the entire manufac-
turing sector by a graph layout based on a physical sim-
ulation. The system in the simulation consists of point-
particles for nodes and springs for links. The springs
obey Hooke’s law with a spring constant, and the parti-
cles have a Coulomb charge with a same sign, exerting
repulsive forces inversely proportional to the square of
mutual distances, for nodes to spread well on the layout.
A resistance force is also acting on each particle, being
proportional to its velocity, in order to relax the system
in a final layout. The Barnes-Hut tree algorithm [35] is
employed for fast computation, and the Coulomb interac-
tion was calculated on a special-purpose device (GRAPE;
gravity pipeline) invented for astrophysical N -body sim-
ulation [36]. The result is depicted in Fig. 4. Details of
the layout method is given in [37].
One can observe that nodes within a tightly-knit group
cluster at mutually near positions in the layout, while
different communities are separated from each other with
overlapping portions. The sub-communities stated above
appear as clusters nested in the community of electronics.
Also even closer look in enlargement (not shown in the
figure) shows blobs corresponding to hubs or large firms
associated with their suppliers and customers.
V. CHAIN OF BANKRUPTCY
Let us now turn our attention to the dynamics on the
production network. Firms put value added on inter-
mediate goods in anticipation of gaining profits — an-
ticipation, because no firm knows how much their pro-
duced goods might actually be demanded by other firms
and consumers. In addition, they face uncertainty in the
change of costs for intermediate goods to purchase as
inputs, as well as in fluctuations of labor and financial
costs. Only a posteriori , therefore, a firm’s profit, be-
ing equal to sales minus costs, is determined through the
interaction with others in the network.
Supplier-customer link is a credit relation [38]. When-
ever one delivers goods to others without an immedi-
ate exchange of money or goods of full value, credit is
extended. Frequently, suppliers provide credit to their
customers, who supply credit to their customers and so
forth. Also customers can provide credit to their suppli-
ers so as to have them produce an abundance of interme-
diate goods beforehand. In either case, once a firm goes
into financial insolvency state, its creditors will possibly
lose the scheduled payment, or goods to be delivered that
have been necessary for production. The influence prop-
agates from the bankrupted customer to its upstream
in the former cases, and similarly from the bankrupted
supplier to its downstream in the latter cases. Thus a
creditor has its balance-sheet deteriorated in accumula-
tion, and may eventually go into bankruptcy. This is an
example of a chain of bankruptcy .
A bankruptcy chain does not occur only along the
supplier-customer links. Ownership relation among firms
is another typical possibility for such creditor-debtor re-
lationship. It is, however, also frequently observed in
our dataset that supplier-customer links are also present
between holding and held companies, and siblings and af-
filiated firms. We assume that most relevant paths along
which the chain of bankruptcy occurs are the creditor-
debtor links of the production network.
As explained in Section II, we have an exhaustive
list of bankruptcies. Corresponding to the snapshot of
the network taken in September 2006, we employ all
the bankruptcies for exactly one-year period from Octo-
ber. The number of bankruptcies amounts to roughly
0.013 million, daily mean being 30, and includes a
few bankruptcies of listed firms. Nearly half of the
bankrupted firms, precisely Nb ≡ 6264, were present on
the network at the beginning and went into bankruptcy
during the period. The rest are of extremely small-size,
typically with one employee, and were not included as
nodes, which we assume irrelevant to our purpose as well
as new entry of firms during the same period.
Let us define the probability of bankruptcy in the
one-year period by the ratio between the number of
bankrupted nodes, Nb, and the initially present nodes,
N given by (1), by
p = Nb/N ≈ 0.620% . (11)
Note that the probability has inverse of time in its phys-
ical dimension. A year was chosen for the time-scale so
that it should be longer than the time-scale for financial
activities of firms, typically weeks and months, and be
shorter than that for the change of network itself.
A. Avalanche-size distribution
Let us first take a look at how a certain size of chain
of bankruptcies actually takes place. Here a chain is de-
fined as a set of bankrupted nodes that are connected by
links that are present in the initial network. If nodes are
white and black according to survival and bankruptcy
during the period, a chain means connected black nodes
surrounded by white nodes, and its size refers to the num-
ber of black nodes in the chain. Note that a chain is not
necessarily a path in the graph, but can be a tree, and
may include cycles in it.
Fig. 5 shows the size-distribution of such avalanches by
filled squares, which represents the frequency distribution
of avalanches with a specific size. The observed values are
tabulated in Table IV.
B. Evaluation of accidental chain
Let us then evaluate how a certain size of chain of
actual bankruptcies occurs more or less frequently than
9FIG. 5: Frequency (vertical in log-scale) of avalanches with
a specific size (horizontal in linear). Filled squares are the
observed frequencies in the observation. Open circles show a
theoretical calculation for randomized networks with anony-
mous nodes (see (a) in the text), and a line with error bars
represents a Monte-Carlo calculation for randomized networks
with same bankrupted nodes as observed ones (b).
TABLE IV: Comparison between the actual value of the
chain-bankruptcy and the values expected from coincidence.
“Obs.” for the observed values, “Theor.” for the theoretical
values of coincidence, “O/T” for the ratios between them,
while “RNW” is the value obtained by simulation for the ran-
domized network.
Obs. Theor. O/T RNWa
B1 5507 6013 0.9 5985(21)
B2 226 76.9 (82.3
b) 2.9 118.5(10.0)
B3 52 8.6
b 6.0 10.5(3.2)
B4 17 2.2
b 7.7 1.7(1.1)
aStandard deviations in parentheses (each 1,000 randomizations).
bMean-field approximations.
what is expected simply by chance. Suppose, in a random
network with a specified degree sequence, one selects Np
nodes for failure, where p is the probability of failure per
node. Then calculate the frequency of a certain number
of failed nodes that are connected by links, and we can
compare the frequency of accidental chain of failures with
that for an actual chain of bankruptcies. We shall use
the terms, failures and failed nodes, to mean a set of
black nodes that are selected randomly and uniformly
over all the nodes, and to distinguish them from the set
of actually observed bankruptcies and bankrupted nodes.
The selection of failed nodes can be done in two ways,
that is, (a) by choosing uniformly random nodes to fail ir-
relevantly from the actual data of nodes, or alternatively
(b) by specifying exactly the same bankrupted nodes in
the actual data, but in otherwise randomized network
with the same degree sequence as the real one. These two
ways possibly yield different results for our purpose, so
let us perform the evaluation in both ways. The evalua-
tion (a) allows us to understand how the accidental chain
is related to the network properties, especially degree dis-
tribution and correlation, the results of which were given
in Section III. On the other hand, we can take into ac-
count of difference between failures and bankruptcies in
our terminology here. We elaborate the calculation of (a)
in the following Section V C. For the calculation of (b),
the estimates are obtained by a Monte Carlo simulation
generating random networks with failures associated to
the actually bankrupted nodes.
We denote by Bm the number of clusters, each with m
failed nodes that are connected by links, in average for
randomized networks with the same degree distribution
P (k) as the actual production network. Since the clus-
tering coefficient is of the same order of magnitude as
what is expected by chance, we assume that the network
is tree-like. We shall calculate Bm for m = 1, 2, 3 and 4
in order.
The results are summarized in Table IV and Fig. 5 for
the actually observed values of Bm along with the evalu-
ated values based on the above-mentioned two classes
of randomized networks, (a) and (b), in the columns
“Theor.” and “RNW” respectively. We find that (a) and
(b) give quantitatively similar estimates. By comparing
the actually observed values with the evaluation for ran-
dom networks with a same degree sequence, we can con-
clude that the avalanche size has a much heavier tail in its
distribution for size larger than 3. Those large avalanches
involve regionally and industrially related firms, as we
could confirm from our dataset. Therefore, the vulnera-
ble paths, along which a chain of bankruptcy takes place
are present in those modular groups. The following Sec-
tion V C is devoted to the explanation of the evaluation
(a).
C. Evaluation for accidental chain of failures
We count the number of accidental chain of failures
in a given, tree-like network, where all the failures occur
randomly with probability p per node.
1. B1: Isolated failure
Denoting the number of nodes of degree k by K1(k),
it is related to the degree distribution P (k) by
P (k) =
1
N
K1(k) . (12)
Obviously
∞∑
k=1
K1(k) = N . (13)
Among K1(k) such nodes, the average number of failed
nodes is pK1(k). Since the probability that all the nodes
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connected to a failed node are not in failure is (1−p)k (see
Fig. 6), the average number of isolated failure is given by
B1 =
∞∑
k=1
pK1(k) (1− p)k = pNR1 , (14)
R1 ≡
〈
(1− p)k〉 , (15)
where 〈·〉 means average over the nodes, i.e.,
〈f(k)〉 ≡
∞∑
k=1
f(k)K1(k)
∞∑
k=1
K1(k)
. (16)
Note that since Np is equal to the actual number of
the bankruptcies, R1 gives the rate of the isolated fail-
ure. From the observed distribution of K1(k) and p ≈
0.006204, we obtain
R1 ≈ 0.9600 , (17)
B1 ≈ 6013.2 . (18)
The actual number of the isolated bankruptcies is 5,507,
being 92% of this estimate. Following the standard ar-
gument for 1/
√
n estimate of the statistical errors, we
see that there are less number of isolated bankruptcies in
actuality than that expected by chance.
The results (17) and (18) apply to any class of networks
with the same degree sequence K1(k), in particular, irre-
spectively of degree correlation.
FIG. 6: Clusters of m failed nodes that are connected by links,
which contribute to B1,2,3. Black nodes are failed ones, and
white nodes are non-failed. The numbers attached with failed
nodes correspond to the subscripts of degrees, j for kj .
2. B2
We denote by K2(k1, k2), the number of pairs of nodes;
each pair of nodes having degree k1 and k2. Precisely,
choose a node with degree k1, and count the nodes with
degree k2 connected with the first node. After doing this
over all the nodes and by adding up the resulting num-
bers, one has the quantity K2(k1, k2). Now the number
of double-failure case, B2, can be expressed by K2(k1, k2)
as follows:
B2 =
1
2
∞∑
k1,k2=1
K2(k1, k2) p(1− p)k1−1 p(1− p)k2−1
=
1
2
p2
(1− p)2 R2
∞∑
k1,k2=1
K2(k1, k2) , (19)
R2 ≡
〈
(1− p)k1+k2〉
2
, (20)
where the combinatorial factor 1/2 accounts for the over-
counting the chain in the reverse order of k1 and k2, and
〈·〉2 denotes the average over the links, defined by
〈f(k1, k2)〉2 ≡
∞∑
k1,k2=1
K2(k1, k2)f(k1, k2)
∞∑
k1,k2=1
K2(k1, k2)
. (21)
From the definition, K2(k1, k2) satisfies the identities:
K2(k1, k2) = K2(k2, k1) , (22)
∞∑
k2=1
K2(k1, k2) = k1K1(k1) . (23)
The two identities lead to the summation formula:
∞∑
k1,k2=1
K2(k1, k2) = N 〈k〉 , (24)
which is exactly twice the number of links, as it should
be. The following identity is also useful.
∞∑
k1,k2=1
K2(k1, k2)k
n
2 = N 〈k〉 〈kn2 〉2 = N
〈
kn+1
〉
. (25)
Using Eq. (24), B2 can be put as
B2 =
1
2
p2
(1− p)2 R2N 〈k〉 . (26)
The factor R2 can be calculated directly from the ac-
tual values of K2(k1, k2). The result is
R2 ≈ 0.488 , (27)
which leads to
B2 ≈ 76.9 . (28)
The observed value is about three times of this estimate,
as shown in Table IV, which indicates the double-failure
chain is much more abundant than what is expected by
chance.
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— Random-network approximation —
In the case of random network, the estimation reduces
to a simple expression. In fact, first note that K2(k1, k2)
can be written in terms of K1(k) as follows:
K
(ran)
2 (k1, k2) =
1
N 〈k〉K1(k1) k1k2K1(k2) , (29)
because it is equal to the number of nodes of degree k1,
K1(k), multiplied by the probability of choosing the node
of degree k2, k2K1(k2)/
∑∞
k2=1
k2K1(k2). Note that (29)
satisfies the identities (22) and (23) as is required for the
consistency of the calculation. Inserting (29) into (20)
and (21), the value of R2 in this approximation is given
by
R
(ran)
2 = R
2
11 , (30)
where
R11 ≡
〈
k(1− p)k〉
〈k〉 ≈ 0.723 . (31)
This yields
R
(ran)
2 ≈ 0.523 , (32)
and
B
(ran)
2 =
1
2
p2
(1− p)2 R
(ran)
2 N 〈k〉 ≈ 82.3 , (33)
as being tabulated in Table IV.
3. B3
We define K3(k1, k2, k3) in a similar way for K2(k1, k2);
take a node with degree k1, continue the counting to
nodes with degree k2 and then k3 (see Fig. 6). B3 is
given by
B3 =
1
2
∞∑
k1,k2,k3=1
K3(k1, k2, k3)
× p(1− p)k1−1p(1− p)k2−2p(1− p)k3−1
=
1
2
p3
(1− p)4 R3K
(sum)
3 , (34)
R3 ≡
〈
(1− p)k1+k2+k3〉
3
, (35)
K
(sum)
3 ≡
∞∑
k1,k2,k3=1
K3(k1, k2, k3) , (36)
where the combinatorial factor 1/2 is to cancel the over-
counting, and 〈·〉3 refers to the average weighted with
K3(k1, k2, k3) in the same manner as that in Eq. (16)
and (21).
By definition, K3(k1, k2, k3) satisfies the following
identities:
K3(k1, 0, k3) = 0 , (37)
K3(k1, k2, k3) = K3(k3, k2, k1) , (38)
∞∑
k3=1
K3(k1, k2, k3) = K2(k1, k2)(k2 − 1) . (39)
Using the identities (39) and (23) we find that
K
(sum)
3 = N
(〈
k2
〉− 〈k〉) ≈ 3.09× 109. (40)
— Random-network approximation —
Since exact evaluation of R3 involves the evaluation of
K3(k1, k2, k3), which requires a huge computational re-
source, let us evaluate R3 by using a random-network
approximation. By considering attaching the nodes #2
and #3 successively to the node #1 with equal probabil-
ity on each links as in the case of K
(ran)
2 , we obtain the
following:
K
(ran)
3 (k1, k2, k3) =
1
N2 〈k〉2K1(k1)k1k2K1(k2)(k2 − 1)k3K1(k3) , (41)
which satisfies identities (37)–(40), except that K2 is re-
placed by K
(ran)
2 in (39). By using the above in (34) we
obtain;
R
(ran)
3 = R
2
11
R12
〈
k2
〉−R11 〈k〉
〈k2〉 − 〈k〉 (42)
where
R12 ≡
〈
k2(1− p)k〉
〈k2〉 ≈ 0.0450 . (43)
This leads to
R
(ran)
3 ≈ 0.0226 , (44)
B
(ran)
3 ≈ 8.55 . (45)
4. B4
The clusters that contribute to B4 are illustrated in
Fig. 7, and are divided into two types as depicted. One
has to understand that larger clusters are more rare
events so that statistical errors in observation increase
drastically. With this in mind, let us perform estima-
tion, and compare them with the observed values.
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FIG. 7: Two types of clusters that contribute to B4. Non-
failed nodes (white nodes in Fig. 6) are not drawn.
Type (a)
Contribution of the cluster (a) can be written as follows
using the number of strings k1–k4, K4(k1, k2, k3, k4);
B4a =
1
2
p4
∞∑
k1,k2,k3,k4=1
K4(k1, k2, k3, k4)
× (1− p)k1−1
( 3∏
j=2
(1− p)kj−2
)
(1− p)k4−1
=
1
2
p4
(1− p)6R4aK
(sum)
4 , (46)
R4a ≡ 〈(1− p)
∑4
i=1 ki〉4 , (47)
where definitions of 〈·〉4 and K(sum)4 should be self-
evident.
Let us first calculate K
(sum)
4 . The identities satisfied
by K4(k1, k2, k3, k4) are similar to those of K3(k1, k2, k3)
and would be now obvious. Using them, the summations
over k1 and k4 can be carried out as follows,
K
(sum)
4 =
∞∑
k2,k3=1
K2(k2, k3)(k2 − 1)(k3 − 1) (48)
In the expansion of each summand, all the terms except
for those of k2k3 allow further summation by repeatedly
using the identities given so far. On the other hand, since
the coefficient of the k2k3-term is K2(k2, k3), this term
should be related to degree correlation. As usual, we
define the correlation coefficient r1 by
r1 ≡ 〈k1k2〉2 − 〈k1〉
2
2
〈k21〉2 − 〈k1〉22
, (49)
Using this definition, we can write that
〈k1k2〉2 = r1
〈
k2
〉
2
+ (1− r1)〈k〉22
= r1
〈
k3
〉
〈k〉 + (1− r1)
(〈
k2
〉
〈k〉
)2
, (50)
where we used Eq. (25) and re-labeled the subscripts in
the degrees. Thus the k2k3-term reads
∞∑
k1,k2=1
k1k2K2(k1, k2) = N 〈k〉 〈k1k2〉2
=N
(
r1
〈
k3
〉
+ (1− r1)
〈
k2
〉2
〈k〉
)
. (51)
Putting all the terms together, we have
K
(sum)
4 = N
(
r1
〈
k3
〉
+ (1− r1)
〈
k2
〉2
〈k〉 − 2
〈
k2
〉
+ 〈k〉
)
.
(52)
The random-network approximation for this case re-
quires a careful treatment because of the appearance of
the degree correlation coefficient r1 in the above summa-
tion formula. Although its value given in (9) is small, it
has a critical role in the above equations: If we use the
random-network approximation for K2 given in (29), we
obtain the r1 = 0 result;
∞∑
k1,k2=1
k1k2K
(ran)
2 (k1, k2) = N
〈
k2
〉2
〈k〉 ≈ 1.188× 10
12,
(53)
while the exact value is
∞∑
k1,k2=1
k1k2K2(k1, k2) ≈ 1.342× 1011. (54)
The role of the correlation coefficient r1 is evident in
these values; it brings in partial cancellations between
the first term and the second term, so that the actual
value is much smaller than that of the random-network
value (53). Note that this is deeply connected with the
asymptotic behavior of the degree distribution noted in
Section III B: If all the moments of degree is of order
one, the effect of the correlation coefficient r1 is not this
drastic. However, due to the degree distribution being
power-law, the moments
〈
k2
〉
and
〈
k3
〉
are proportional
to a positive power of N (we will elaborate on the anal-
ysis in Appendix refsec:appA) and thus are quite large,
resulting in the importance of cancellation by r1 observed
above.
For this reason, we evaluate B4a in two schemes in the
following. The first scheme is to use the exact distribu-
tion for K2(k2, k3) but use the random-network approxi-
mation for k1 and k4, so that (54) is satisfied. The second
one is to use the random-network approximation to all
the nodes in K4. We will carry out the calculation of
both schemes separately.
— Random-network approximation 1 —
The first approximation scheme is given by
K
(ran1)
4 (k1, k2, k3, k4) =
1
N2 〈k〉2
×K1(k1)k1(k2 − 1)K2(k2, k3)(k3 − 1)k4K1(k4) , (55)
which is obtained by attaching the #1 and #4 nodes to
a #2–#3 pair randomly. It is evident that this satisfies
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the identity (48) and therefore (52). It then follows that
R
(ran1)
4a =
R211
K
(sum)
4
×
∞∑
k2,k3=1
(1− p)k2+k3(k2 − 1)(k3 − 1)K2(k2, k3)
≈ 8.33× 10−3 . (56)
From this we obtain
B
(ran1)
4a ≈ 0.819 . (57)
— Random-network approximation 2 —
In the second, complete random-network approxima-
tion, we have
K
(ran2)
4 (k1, k2, k3, k4) =
1
N3 〈k〉3
×K1(k1)k1k2K1(k2)(k2 − 1)k3K1(k3)(k3 − 1)k4K1(k4) ,
(58)
which is obtained by connecting the node #2,3,4 in se-
quence, or alternatively, by substituting the random net-
work approximation K
(ran)
2 in (29) for K2 in (55). We
then obtain the following:
R
(ran2)
4a = R
2
11
(
R12
〈
k2
〉−R11 〈k〉
〈k2〉 − 〈k〉
)2
≈ 9.77× 10−4 , (59)
which leads to
B
(ran2)
4a ≈ 0.884 , (60)
which is very close to B
(ran1)
4a .
Type (b)
For the other type of (b), we can write as
B4b =
1
3!
p4
∞∑
k1,k2,k3,k4=1
J4(k1, k2, k3, k4)
× (1− p)k1−3
4∏
j=2
(1− p)kj−1
≡ 1
3!
p4
(1− p)7 R4b J
(sum)
4 , (61)
where
J
(sum)
4 ≡
∞∑
k1,k2,k3,k4=1
J4(k1, k2, k3, k4) , (62)
and R4b is a ratio defined by the above. In this case, we
denote by J4(k1, k2, k3, k4), the number of the clusters of
type (b) with the degrees ki of nodes #i in Fig. 7. The
combinatorial factor 1/3! cancels the over-counting of a
same cluster. The following identities hold:
J4(k1, k2, k3, k4) = J4(k1, kσ(2), kσ(3), kσ(4)), (63)
∞∑
k4=1
J4(k1, k2, k3, k4) = K3(k2, k1, k3)(k1 − 2), (64)
where σ(j) represents a permutation of j = 2, 3, 4. Using
the identities, we have
∞∑
k3,k4=1
J4(k1, k2, k3, k4) = K2(k2, k1)(k1 − 1)(k1 − 2) ,
(65)
which leads to
J
(sum)
4 = N
(〈
k3
〉− 3 〈k2〉+ 2 〈k〉) . (66)
— Random-network approximation —
As seen in (66), the degree-correlation does not play
any major role for this type of cluster. So, unlike the
case of B4a, let us employ a simple random-network ap-
proximation of the form:
J
(ran)
4 (k1, k2, k3, k4) =
1
N3 〈k〉3K1(k1)
× k1k2K1(k2)(k1 − 1)k3K1(k3)(k1 − 2)k4K1(k4) ,
(67)
which satisfies identities (63)–(66) with K2 replaced by
K
(ran)
2 . We obtain the following:
R
(ran)
4b = R
3
11
R13
〈
k3
〉− 3R12 〈k2〉+R11 〈k〉
〈k3〉 − 3 〈k2〉+ 〈k〉
≈ 3.52× 10−4, (68)
where
R13 ≡
〈
k3(1− p)k〉
〈k3〉 ≈ 9.57× 10
−4 . (69)
This leads to
B
(ran)
4b ≈ 1.39 . (70)
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VI. DISCUSSION
In the preceding section, we found that the size of
chained bankruptcies is frequently larger than what is ex-
pected simply by chance. This fact implies that supplier-
customer links can be potentially a vulnerable path for a
chain of bankruptcies causing a sequence of failures, and
that it is important to do monitoring and prediction of
such failures on a nation-wide scale. Let us remark a few
things concerning the finding.
Firstly, the study on community structure in Sec-
tion IV showed that the firms are often tightly knitted
into clusters characterized by closeness in industrial sec-
tors and/or geographical locations. Because those firms
in such a cluster are susceptible to common risk factors
specific to the sector or the location, the bankruptcies in
a cluster can be correlated due to the similar profiles of
those firms, but not necessarily due to the “link” effect.
It is not easy, in the present analysis, to separate the
link effect from the sectoral or locational correlation, but
yet we can roughly estimate the relative importance of
the link effect. Although it is difficult to determine a
single cause in each bankruptcy, there exists a pattern
of types in the cause of failure, which are categorized
and compiled in the database. The most frequent one
is the poor performance in business, typically slow sales
and decreasing profit due to adverse and sluggish market
conditions. The other main category is the linked failure
due to a secondary effect from bankruptcy of customer,
subsidiary or affiliated companies, which often causes the
loss of accounts receivable. See [39] for the details.
For the bankrupted nodes Nb studied in Section V,
the categorized causes of bankruptcy are the poor per-
formance (60%) and the link effect (7%). But if a pair of
bankrupted nodes are connected by a supplier-customer
link, the link effect is considerable (27%), while the poor
performance cases or “solo” failures are relatively less fre-
quent (42%). This fact, therefore, shows that the chain
of bankruptcy we observed in the preceding section is
largely, even if not entirely, due to the link effect taking
place along the supplier-customer links.
Secondly, the chain of bankruptcy has a great influ-
ence in a nation-wide economy. In fact, the total amount
of debts for bankrupted firms in a year typically ranges
from 10 to 25 trillion yen in the last 10 years, roughly
equal to more than 100 billion euro. This amounts to 2%
or even more of the nominal GDP in Japan. Of course,
all the debts are not to be lost, but it should not be un-
dervalued the fact that there are a large number of cred-
itors who have given credits to those bankrupted firms.
Therefore, the study on the chain of failures and its rip-
ple effect has practical applications. Recent models such
as a model of credit chains and bankruptcies [9], simula-
tion of avalanche effect [40], Potts-like model of contagion
[11] (see also references in [18]) would provide valuable
insights and tools to do monitoring of financial fragility
and prediction of such failures on a nation-wide scale.
Thirdly, from a broader perspective, the production
network has a similarity in its structure with other eco-
nomic networks. While the inter-bank networks have
unique structure among financial institutions [12–14],
and the banks-firms networks is basically a bipartite net-
work [15], the ownership networks [16, 17] possess simi-
lar properties of network. In particular, the community
structure has industry-sectoral modules in a hierarchical
way. However, the common sets of supplies play impor-
tant constituents in the production network, as we have
explained by the example of automobile companies in
Section IV, and this is completely different from the own-
ership networks. We would yet need a more systematic
comparison with other economic networks for the study
of similarity and dissimilarity.
VII. SUMMARY
We studied a large-scale structure of the nation-wide
production network comprising a million firms and four
million supplier-customer links in Japan. The set of
nodes covers most active firms. Each link was chosen
and considered as important, in a systematic survey of
credit informations, by at least one of the firms at ei-
ther end of the link, as its suppliers and customers. We
found scale-free degree distribution, disassortativity, cor-
relation of degree to firm-size, and small clustering co-
efficients compared with randomized networks with the
same degree sequence. In the community analysis, which
is based on modularity optimization, we were able to
identify communities in the manufacturing sector, and
found that they can be interpreted as modules depend-
ing on industrial sectors and geographical regions. Large
communities contained subgroups that can be character-
ized also by industrial organization and development.
In addition, by employing an exhaustive list of
bankruptcies that took place on the production network,
we took a close look at the size distribution for chains of
bankruptcies, or avalanche-size distribution. We elabo-
rated a method to evaluate the frequencies of accidental
chain in randomized networks, and found that the ac-
tual avalanche has a heavy tail distribution in its size.
Combining with the large-scale properties and hetero-
geneity in modular structures, we claim that the effect
to a number of creditors, non-trivially large due to the
heavy tail in the degree distribution, is considerable in
the real economy of the nation.
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Appendix A: Analytic estimates of R’s and the
asymptotic behavior of the degree distribution
Since the probability of failure p is small, one might
want to utilize a perturbative evaluation of the ratios,
R’s. Indeed such an analytical expression would be help-
ful in understanding what essentially determines the rate
of the chain-bankruptcy. In this Appendix, we show that
the asymptotic behavior of the degree distribution plays
the key role.
Let us denote the probability density function (pdf)
of the degree k by P (k) and its cumulative distribution
function (cdf) by
P>(k) =
∞∑
k′=k
P (k′) . (A1)
We parametrize the cdf as
P>(k) ∼
(
k
k0
)−µ
, (A2)
for large k. It follows that P (k) ∝ k−µ−1 in the same
region. For our data of the production network regarded
as an undirected graph, we have
µ ≈ 1.366 , (A3)
k0 ≈ 2.18 , (A4)
as maximum likelihood estimate (with the standard error
of µ being 0.099).
We define the generating function for the degree dis-
tribution by
G(q) =
∞∑
k=1
e−qkP (k) , (A5)
which satisfy G(0) = 1. The desired ratios are expressed
in terms of the generating function G(q) as
R1 =
G(q0)
〈k〉 ,
R1n = −G
(n)(q0)
〈kn〉 ,
where G(n)(q) is the n-th derivative of G(q) with respect
to q, and q0 = − log(1− p) ≈ 6.20× 10−3.
One might attempt the following analytic expansion of
G(q):
G(q) =
∞∑
k=1
(
1− qk + 1
2
q2k2 + . . .
)
P (k)
= 1− 〈k〉 q + 1
2
〈
k2
〉
q2 + . . . . (A6)
This turns out to be not a useful expansion as is shown
in what follows. Instead, we shall give an improved ex-
pansion.
For the distribution (A2), the second moment of degree
is divergent for µ < 2 in a network with an infinite size.
It is finite but has a large value for network of a finite
size. Actually, for our data〈
k2
〉
= 3069.6 , (A7)
while 〈k〉 = 8.006. So the expansion to the second order
is a good approximation only for
q  〈k〉〈k2〉 ≈ 2.61× 10
−3 , (A8)
but this does not hold in the present case. This is illus-
trated in Fig. 8, where the solid curve is the actual G(q),
the curve (a) the first two terms in the expansion (A6),
the curve (b) all three terms in the expansion (A6).
FIG. 8: The generating function for the degree distribution,
G(q) for q ≈ 0. The solid curve is the actual plot. The
first-order and the second-order approximations in Eq. (A6)
are shown by the dashed line (a) and the dash-dot line (b)
respectively. The dotted line (c) is the improved expansion
given by (A15). The vertical line corresponds to the actual
value of q0 = − log(1− p).
Let us now estimate the order of the coefficients of the
naive expansion (A6) analytically. The m-th moment of
degree is dominated by the large k region for m > µ as
〈km〉 ∝
k(max)∑
kmk−µ−1
'
∫ k(max)
kmk−µ−1dk ' km−µ(max) . (A9)
On the other hand, by considering the node of the largest
degree being the top of the cdf (A2), we have
k−µ(max) ∝
1
N
. (A10)
Therefore, we obtain
〈km〉 ∝ N−1+mµ , (A11)
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TABLE V: The true values and the estimates obtained from
(A15).
Ratio Exact value Estimate Difference
R1 0.9600 0.9611 0.11%
R11 0.7230 0.7017 -2.9%
R12 4.501× 10−2 4.575× 10−2 1.6%
R13 9.574× 10−4 9.440× 10−4 -1.3%
for m > µ. It follows from (A11) that the m-th term in
(A6) is of order,
N−1
m!
(
N1/µq
)m
. (A12)
Therefore the m-th order term is of the same order of
magnitude as the (m+ 1)-th order term provided that
m ' N1/µq ≈ 154.7 , (A13)
meaning that we need much more than 155 terms for the
expansion (A6) to be useful for evaluation of our ratios.
An improved approximation can be obtained as fol-
lows. Let us extract an analytic contribution of the
power-law tail by means of an analytic continuation:∫ ∞
µ
k−µ−1
k−µ0
e−qkdk ' µ(qk0)µΓ(−µ) . (A14)
For 1 < µ < 2, this contribution is of larger power of p
than that of the second-order, p2, term in (A6). There-
fore, we arrive at the following approximation,
G(q) = 1− 〈k〉 q + µΓ(−µ)(k0q)µ + . . . . (A15)
Alternatively, this expression can be obtained by evalu-
ating the dominant k ∼ k(max) contribution in G(q) −
(1 − 〈k〉 q). Also it should be noted that this expression
is valid for q  1/k(max), since we extended the inte-
gration to k = ∞ in (A14), instead of cutting it off at
k = k(max). The curve (c) in Fig. 8 depicts the behavior
of the first three terms on the right-hand side of (A15).
It is evident that the improved expansion works as an ex-
cellent approximation as shown in the plot. In fact, the
comparison between the estimates of the ratios obtained
from (A15) and the true values are excellent as seen in
Table. V.
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